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We generalize measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution [ H.-K. Lo, M. Curty,
and B. Qi, Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 130503 (2012) ] to the scenario where the Bell-state measurement
station contains also heralded quantum memories. We find analytical formulas, in terms of device
imperfections, for all quantities entering in the secret key rates, i.e., the quantum bit error rate
and the repeater rate. We assume either single-photon sources or weak coherent pulse sources plus
decoy states. We show that it is possible to significantly outperform the original proposal, even in
presence of decoherence of the quantum memory. Our protocol may represent the first natural step
for implementing a two-segment quantum repeater.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum communication has been developed in the
last thirty years. One prominent communication proto-
col is quantum key distribution (QKD) which aims at dis-
tributing a secret key between two distant parties. Suit-
able quantum systems for quantum communication are
photons as they have very low decoherence and they can
be easily generated, distributed and detected with stan-
dard technology. However, due to absorption in optical
fibers (or free-space), QKD with reasonable rates is only
possible up to ca. 150 km [1]. To overcome this prob-
lem quantum repeaters have been developed [2]. The
idea is to divide the distance between Alice and Bob in
segments, to create entanglement in each segment and
then to enlarge the distance using entanglement swap-
ping. Nowadays, the constituting parts of a quantum re-
peater have been realized and small networks have been
implemented in a laboratory set-up [3]. However, a com-
plete quantum repeater (even with two segments) that
will permit to outperform direct transmission has not
been realized yet [4].
Recently, measurement-device-independent QKD
(MDI-QKD-RELAY ) has been proposed [5, 6]. This
protocol is based on the principle of a quantum relay [7]
and uses weak coherent pulse (WCP) sources. Briefly
speaking, two parties, Alice and Bob, each equipped
with a WCP source, send photon pulses to a station
which performs a Bell-state measurement (BSM) and
communicates the result to Alice and Bob. Then Alice
sends Bob information regarding the used basis such that
if necessary Bob can implement a bit flip. This protocol
is measurement-device-independent because Alice and
Bob do not need to measure anything and therefore
the protocol is immune to detector attacks [8, 9]. The
MDI-QKD-RELAY has already been implemented
experimentally both in laboratory environment and
in a real-world environment [10–12]. Moreover, more
efficient protocols have already been proposed [13–15]
and finite-size corrections have been analyzed [15–17].
In this paper we extend the original MDI-QKD-
RELAY protocol [5] introducing quantum memories in
the BSM station. The first consequence is that herald-
ing, provided by quantum memories, permits to improve
the rate at a given distance where MDI-QKD can be
used. The advantage of our protocol over other quantum
repeater protocols is that it does not need entanglement
sources but only commercial off-the-shelf weak coherent
pulse sources. Quantum memories have not reached the
commercial market yet but they are under active devel-
opment. With our protocol we show that it is possible to
use quantum memories with low coherence time.
The manuscript is organized as follows. In Sec. II
we present a generalization of measurement-device-
independent QKD with single-photon sources to the sce-
nario with quantum memories. We derive the formula
for the secret key rate and we study its dependency on
the decoherence of the quantum memories. Finally, we
compare the secret key rate obtained with our protocol
with the one obtained with the quantum relay proposed
in [5]. In Sec. III we generalize the whole analysis to
WCP sources. In order to calculate the secret key rate
we consider QKD with decoy states [18, 19]. In Sec. IV
we give our conclusions.
II. SCHEME WITH SINGLE-PHOTON STATES
In this section we extend the MDI-QKD-RELAY
protocol presented in [5] introducing quantum memo-
ries (QM) and using single-photon-sources (SPS), which
would be the ideal type of source for this protocol. There-
fore, although SPSs are still not practical they will per-
mit to establish upper bounds on the achievable secret
key rate, i.e. sources with many-photon pulses or with
additional imperfections will lead to a worse secret key
rates. We denote the protocol considered in this section
as MDI-QKD-REPEATER-SPS .
A. The protocol
In the following we give the steps of the protocol which
is a generalization of the one proposed in [5] (see Fig. 1):
1. Alice and Bob prepare randomly and indepen-
dently one of the four qubit states |ψ〉 ∈
2FIG. 1. (Color online) Scheme of a measurement-device-
independent quantum repeater. The difference w.r.t.
MDI-QKD-RELAY is that quantum memories are used.
QM=quantum memories, BSM=Bell-state measurement.
The two sources produce single-photon states or weak coher-
ent pulses.
{|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} where |±〉 := (|0〉±|1〉)/√2. We
will refer to the set {|0〉 , |1〉} as the Z-basis (or rec-
tilinear basis) and the set {|+〉 , |−〉} as the X-basis
(or diagonal basis). The states are sent through
the quantum channel to the repeater station. The
information related to the created states is stored
by Alice and Bob locally. This process is repeated
continuously by Alice and Bob with frequency νs
which is the repetition frequency of the source.
2. When both quantum memories are filled up, the
quantum memories are read and a Bell-state mea-
surement (BSM) is performed. The result of the
BSM and the fact that the measurement was suc-
cessful are sent to both Alice and Bob.
3. If the measurement was successful Alice and Bob
will keep their stored information and if needed one
of the two parties will perform a bit flip. If the
measurement was not successful then Alice and Bob
will remove their classical information from their
stored pool of data.
4. After creating sufficiently many bits Alice and Bob
do the usual QKD post-processing which consists of
sifting, parameter estimation, error correction and
privacy amplification [1].
The second step is different from the original MDI-
QKD-RELAY protocol. Here quantum memories are
used for increasing the entanglement swapping success
probability. As a result the total secret key rate will be
higher than for the case without quantum memories.
B. The secret key rate
Concerning the security, the protocol is equivalent to
the entanglement-based repeater protocol 1 [5, 20, 21].
In this paper we consider the asymptotic secret key rate
which gives an upper bound on the achievable secret key
rate. Finite size corrections can be included using the
analysis done in [16, 17]. The formula for the asymptotic
secret key rate is given in [1, 5]
rREP∞ :=
1
< T >
(1− h(eZ)− h(eX)), (1)
where h(p) := −p log2 p− (1−p) log2(1−p) is the binary
Shannon entropy, eX(eZ) is the quantum bit error rate
(QBER) in the X-basis (Z-basis) and 1
<T>
is the raw key
rate2. The QBER represents the fraction of discordant
bits in the raw key, which is the collection of bits stored
by Alice and Bob before the post-processing.
We give now an analytical expression for the raw key
rate. We denote by P0 the probability that the quan-
tum state sent by Alice (Bob) is stored in the quantum
memory3. One knows that this event has happened be-
cause the quantum memories are supposed to be her-
alded. In the following we will measure the time in units
of ∆t := ν−1s which represents the time that the quantum
memory has to wait between two attempts. We introduce
the probability P (kA, kB) that the photons of Alice AND
Bob are stored at time-bin kA and kB and they where not
stored before, i.e.
P (kA, kB) := P
2
0 (1− P0)kA−1(1 − P0)kB−1. (2)
The average number of attempts by the source necessary
1 The equivalence is seen by the following arguments: consider
an entanglement-based repeater protocol where Alice and Bob
each produce the state
∣∣φ+〉
AC
=
∣∣φ+〉
DB
:= 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉).
The subsystems C and D are sent to the channel and sub-
jected to a BSM. On the other hand, subsystems A and
B remain in Alice’s and Bob’s laboratory and are measured
in basis X or Z. For the case where both Alice and Bob
have chosen basis Z, the measurement is described by two
projectors {Π(0) := |0〉 〈0| ,Π(1) := |1〉 〈1|}. The resulting
state is given by
(
(ΠiA ⊗Π
j
B
)⊗ ECD
)
(
∣∣φ+〉
AC
⊗
∣∣φ+〉
DB
) with
i, j = 0, 1. The QKD measurement and BSM act on different
Hilbert spaces and therefore they can be interchanged leading to(
ECD ⊗ (Π
i
A ⊗ Pi
j
B
)
)
(
∣∣φ+〉
AC
⊗
∣∣φ+〉
DB
) = ECD(|i〉C ⊗|j〉D)
where the state |i〉C ⊗ |j〉D represents two single photons pre-
pared in the Z basis with polarization i and j. The case of the
X basis is analogous.
2 The sifting rate does not appear because we employ an asym-
metric protocol where Alice and Bob produce with probability
almost one a state in base X and the remaining times a state in
base Z [22].
3 Here, we consider a completely symmetric set-up which implies
that the success probability is the same on Alice’s and Bob’s side.
However, in case that Alice and Bob have different probabilities,
it is easy to repeat the analysis keeping these two probabilities
different.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) [adapted from [23]] Scheme for entan-
glement swapping with linear optics [3, 24]. The square with
a diagonal line is a polarizing beam splitter in the rectilin-
ear basis and the squares with a circle inside are polarizing
beam splitters in the diagonal basis. Entanglement swapping
is successful if d1 and d3 click (or d1 and d4 or d2 and d3 or
d2 and d4). The state ρA(ρB) is produced by Alice(Bob).
for generating one bit of the raw key is given by
< K > :=
∞∑
s=0
∞∑
k=1
k · s·
(PBSM (k|k, k)(1− PBSM (k|k, k))sP (k, k)+
+
k−1∑
i=1
PBSM (k|k, i)(1− PBSM (k|k, i))sP (k, i)
+
k−1∑
i=1
PBSM (k|i, k)(1− PBSM (k|i, k))sP (i, k)),
(3)
where PBSM (k|kA, kB) is the probability that the BSM
was successful at time k = max(kA, kB) when the two
involved photons where stored at times kA and kB . Note
that if we consider only the first line containing P (k, k)
then we recover the expression for the rate of the re-
lay. The second (third) line accounts for the case that a
photon sent by Bob (Alice) has been stored at a cer-
tain time i < k and the photon sent by Alice (Bob)
has been stored at time k. The average time becomes
< T >:= ∆t < K >.
In order to obtain a closed formula we consider a
specific implementation of the BSM [3, 24] where the
photons are first retrieved from the quantum memories
and then measured with linear optics (see Fig. 2). This
method is probabilistic and when implemented with per-
fect quantum memories and detectors leads to a maximal
success probability of 12 [25]. The BSM is successful when
a particular two-fold detection happens. We consider
practical threshold detectors with detection efficiency ηD
and dark count probability pD. We denote by ηM the re-
trieval probability of a photon from the quantum mem-
ory. The BSM success probability for the scheme given
in Fig. 2 as a function of ηMD := ηMηD is then given by
[26]:
PBSM (ηMD) :=
1
2
(1− pD)2(η2MD + 2(4− 3ηMD)ηMDpD
+ 8(1− ηMD)2p2D). (4)
For pD = 0 as we expect PBSM =
η2
MD
2 . Assuming that
ηM does not depend on the time a simple expression for
the average number of attempts in eq. (3) was derived in
[27, 28],
< K >:=
1
PBSM (ηMD)
3− 2P0
(2− P0)P0 . (5)
In the case of absence of quantum memories we get
< K >relay:= (PBSM (P0ηD))
−1. For small P0 the rate
of the repeater scales as P−10 while the rate for the relay
scales as P−20 . Moreover for the repeater, dark counts do
not play a role as typically pD ≪ ηMD. The equivalent
condition for the relay would be pD ≪ ηDP0, which is
much more difficult to ensure. For the quantum repeater
ηM plays the role of P0 for the relay.
With the same formalism we calculate the QBER
which enters in the formula of the secret key rate. Let
ej(k|kA, kB) be the QBER in the basis j ∈ {X,Z} when
the BSM has been performed at time k and the two pho-
tons were stored at times kA and kB, respectively. Then
the average QBER in the basis j is given by
ej =
∞∑
k=1
[
ej(k|k, k)P (k, k)
+
k−1∑
i=1
ej(k|k, i)P (k, i)
+
k−1∑
i=1
ej(k|i, k)P (i, k)
]
, (6)
where the first line gives the QBER for the case of a
quantum relay, i.e. when both photons arrive at the same
time. The second and third lines include the contribu-
tion to the QBER given by the measurements where one
photon arrived at i < k and the second arrives at time k.
Here, we consider a simple model of decoherence where
the quantum memory stores perfectly a quantum state
for a certain time τ and then it transforms the quantum
state to the identity for t > τ [27]. We call τ the co-
herence time and measure it in units of ∆t. This model
is valid in quantum memories where the fidelity remains
approximately constant for a certain time and then it
drops very fast. Formally, we have
ej(k|kA, kB) := ej(∞)Θ[τ − (k − kA)]Θ[τ − (k − kB)]
+
1
2
(1 −Θ[τ − (k − kA)]Θ[τ − (k − kB)]),
(7)
where Θ[t] is the Heaviside step function [29] such that
Θ[t] = 1 for t ≥ 0 and Θ[t] = 0 for t < 0 and ej(∞) is
4the QBER that would be obtained if the memory does
not decohere (τ →∞) and it is given by [30]
eX(∞) = eZ(∞)
=
2pD
(
2 (ηMD − 1) 2pD − (ηMD − 2) ηMD
)
η2MD + 8 (ηMD − 1) 2p2D + 2 (4− 3ηMD) ηMDpD
.
(8)
Inserting eq. (2), eq. (7) and eq. (8) in eq. (6) we obtain
a closed formula for the average QBER:
ej = ej(∞) + 1
2
(
1
2 − ej(∞)
)
(1− P0)1+τ
2− P0 . (9)
It is easy to verify ej(∞) ≤ ej ≤ 12 and moreover
limτ→∞ ej = ej(∞) and limP0→0 ej = 12 . Note that due
to our specific set-up eX = eZ .
If the QBER is too high it is not possible to extract
a secret key as the secret key rate in eq. (1) becomes
non-positive. When eX = eZ the maximal QBER for
a non-zero secret key rate is given by eMAX := 0.11. A
critical parameter is therefore τMINSPS which represents the
minimal τ permitting to extract a secret key and can be
obtained from eq. (9) by requiring that eX = e
MAX. The
minimal allowed coherence time is given by
τMINSPS =
log
(
(P0−2)(eX (∞)−eMAX)
(P0−1)(2eX (∞)−1)
)
log (1− P0) . (10)
In the following section we will provide numbers for
the minimal coherence time and the secret key rate in a
realistic scenario.
C. Performance
We discuss now the performance of the protocol as a
function of the imperfections of the set-up. Then we an-
alyze the relation with the original MDI-QKD-RELAY
with single-photon states. We consider an implemen-
tation where photons are transmitted through optical
fibers. Therefore P0 := ηT where ηT := 10
− αL
2·10 is the
probability that a photon has not been absorbed after
traveling for a distance L2 and α is the absorption co-
efficient. Throughout the whole paper we will consider
α = 0.17 dB/km which is the lowest attenuation in com-
mon optical fibers. In the following analysis we will con-
sider detectors with detection efficiency ηD = 0.2 and
dark count probability pD = 10
−6. Such detectors are
considered optimistic but not unrealistic [1]. Regarding
quantum memories we use ηM = 0.6 which is a value
already achieved experimentally [3].
In Fig. 3 we show τMINSPS versus the distance between
Alice and Bob. For L = 400 km we get τMIN ≈ 4 · 104
which can be transformed in seconds multiplying by ∆t.
For an hypothetical source at 100 MHz this would corre-
spond to a coherence time of the order of 400 microsec-
onds. Note that single-photon sources at such a speed do
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Minimal coherence time τMIN in units
of ∆t such that the secret key rate is non-zero. Black-solid
line: SPS protocol (see eq. (10)). Red-solid line: WCP proto-
col (derived by calculating the zero of eq. (11)). Parameters:
ηD = 0.2, ηM = 0.6, pD = 10
−6, α = 0.17 dB/km.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Secret key rate per pulse as function
of τ/τMINSPS . Parameters: ηD = 0.2, ηM = 0.6, pD = 10
−6,
α = 0.17 dB/km, L = 400 km.
not yet exist. We will reconsider this number in the next
section when we will consider WCP sources. By increas-
ing the repetition frequency it is possible to use quantum
memories with lower coherence times. This is different
to standard quantum repeater protocols where the coher-
ence time depends also on the communication time. We
see that the curve of τMIN is tightly upper bounded by
the average maximal time that is necessary to wait before
both quantum memories are filled up. This can be under-
stood by observing that for P0 ≪ 1 and eX ≈ 0 we have
< K > PBSM ≈ 32P0 and τMIN ≈
log(2eMAX )
−P0
≈ 1.51
P0
.
In Fig. 4 we show the secret key rate as a function
of τ/τMINSPS for a fixed distance between Alice and Bob
(L = 400 km). We see that a flat region is reached for
τ ≈ 5τMINSPS . The same behavior is found also for other
values of the distance between Alice and Bob.
Finally, we discuss the secret key rate as a function of
the distance and compare it to a set-up without quantum
memories. As shown in Fig. 5, the set-up with quantum
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Secret key rate per pulse versus
distance between Alice and Bob. Parameters: ηD = 0.2,
ηM = 0.6, pD = 10
−6, α = 0.17 dB/km.
memories permits to increase significantly the secret key
rate with respect to a set-up without quantum memories.
For ηD = 0.2, ηM = 0.6 and pD = 10
−6 the cross-over
distance is around 100 km. Moreover, we see that the
difference between τ = 2τMIN and τ = ∞ is very small.
This result suggests that the protocol is not very sus-
ceptible to decoherence of quantum memories: perfect
quantum memories are not needed as coherence times
slightly bigger than τMIN permit to achieve the maximal
secret key rate obtainable with perfect quantum memo-
ries. Moreover, we have performed numerical simulations
for quantum memories where the decoherence model is
depolarization4, and we found that this result does not
change qualitatively.
Concluding this section, we have proven that using
single-photon sources and imperfect quantum memories
it is possible to essentially double the distance with
respect to MDI-QKD-RELAY when implemented with
single-photon sources.
III. SCHEME WITH WEAK COHERENT
PULSE SOURCES
A critical assumption of the previous section was that
Alice and Bob have on-demand single-photon sources
at their disposal. In this section we consider sources
of weak coherent pulses which offer a very high repe-
tition frequency - with current technology even in the
order of GHz [31]. On the other hand this type of
source requires a more complicated security analysis due
to the fact that multi-photon pulses are susceptible to
the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attacks [32]. In or-
der to detect this attack it is possible to use decoy states
4 The model we have considered is D(ρ) := e−
t
τ ρ+ 1−e
−
t
τ
2
1l
where τ is the coherence time.
[18, 19]. In the scheme with decoy states Alice and Bob
prepare phase randomized weak coherent pulses of the
form ρ =
∑∞
n=0 p(n) |n〉 〈n| with p(n) := e−µ µ
n
n! . The
parameter µ is the intensity (average photon number) of
the pulse.
The QKD protocol with decoy states [18, 19] which we
employ here is analogous to the one described in sec. II,
apart from the following differences:
• when Alice and Bob prepare the state they choose
at random and independently also its intensity µ
which is a continuous parameter with 0 ≤ µ < ∞.
One particular intensity µ is chosen with probabil-
ity almost one,
• the measurements for pulses with intensity µ are
used for extracting a secret key, whereas the others
are used for detecting Eve’s PNS attack.
The formula for the secret key rate is analogous to
eq. (1) with the modifications due to the fact that Eve
can perform PNS attacks. It is given by [5]:
r∞ := max
µ>0
[
1
< T >
(f11(1 − h(e11X ))− h(eZ))
]
, (11)
where f11 is the fraction of bits in the raw key which
are generated when Alice and Bob send single-photon
states and e11X is the QBER of these bits. The QBER
e11X , is accessible due to the fact that we use decoy states
[5]. The QBER eZ is determined using all data. All
quantities entering in the formula of the secret key rate
in eq. (11) depend on a generic intensity µ which is then
maximized. The optimal intensity is denoted by µ (see
above). In the following we derive analytical expressions
for these parameters as function of the imperfections of
the set-up. We will assume that detectors have no dark
counts. This will permit to have closed formulas which
will allow to understand the role of each parameter. Dark
counts do not play a crucial role as long as ηMD ≫ pD.
For realistic choice of parameters this condition is easily
satisfied.
Given a pulse of n-photons, the probability that at
least one photon is stored into the quantum memory is
given by (1− (1− ηT )n) where ηT is the probability that
one photon has not been absorbed by the quantum chan-
nel. In general, the probability P0 that a state has been
stored into the quantum memory is given by
P0 :=
∞∑
n=1
p(n)(1− (1− ηT )n)
= 1− e−µηT , (12)
which for µηT ≪ 1 reduces to P0 = µηT as expected.
The BSM success probability depends on the probabil-
ity to store a state with n-photons given that the source
has generated a state of m-photons with m ≥ n. For-
6mally,
P (n) :=
∞∑
m=n
p(m)
(
m
n
)
ηnT (1 − ηT )m−n
=
(ηTµ)
n
n!
e−ηTµ. (13)
The quantity
(
m
n
)
ηnT (1 − ηT )m−n is the probability that
n photons survive from a state with m-photons after the
transmission through the channel. The probability that
the BSM is successful given that one quantum memory
contains na photons and the other nb photons is given by
(see the appendix for our derivation)
PBSM (na, nb) = [(1− ηMD
2
)na − (1 − ηMD)na ]·
· [(1− ηMD
2
)nb − (1− ηMD)nb ]. (14)
For na = nb = 1 we obtain PBSM (1, 1) =
1
2η
2
MD in ac-
cordance to eq. (4). Thus, the BSM success probability
is given by
PBSM := 2
∑∞
na=1
∑∞
nb=1
P (na)P (nb)PBSM (na, nb)∑∞
na=1
∑∞
nb=1
P (na)P (nb)
(15a)
= 2
e−2µηT (ηMD−1)
(
e
1
2
µηMDηT − 1
)
2
(eµηT − 1) 2 . (15b)
The denominator in eq. (15a) gives the probability that
two photons are stored in the quantum memories which
is equal to P 20 . The numerator is the total probability
of all events in which the BSM is successful when one
quantum memory contains na photons and the other one
contains nb photons. The factor 2 comes from the fact
that the BSM with linear optics can distinguish only two
Bell states. For the limiting case µηT ≪ 1 we obtain
PBSM = PBSM (1, 1).
The fraction of measurements coming from single-
photons is denoted as f11 and given by
f11 =
P (1)2PBSM (1, 1)∑∞
na=1
∑∞
nb=1
P (na)P (nb)
(16a)
=
µ2η2MDη
2
T e
µηMDηT−2µ
4
(
e
1
2
µηMDηT − 1
)
2
, (16b)
which in the limit µηT ≪ 1 becomes f11 = 1 as in this
limit all measurements come from single-photon states.
The numerator of eq. (16a) represents the probability
that the sources of Alice and Bob produce single-photons
which are stored in the quantum memories and which
lead to successful BSM. The denominator is the total
probability to obtain a state which does not contain the
vacuum.
Regarding the QBER we observe that if there are no
dark counts then both e11X and eZ are zero. This property
of the protocol has been discussed also in [5]. Therefore,
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Secret key rate versus distance between
Alice and Bob. Comparison between relay [5] (blue) and re-
peater (see eq. (11) )(red). Parameters: ηD = 0.2, ηM = 0.6,
pD = 0, α = 0.17 dB/km, τ = ∞.
errors will arise only due to decoherence. The calcula-
tion is analogous to the one for single-photon sources of
sec. ??. We assume the same decoherence model. The
only difference comes from the fact that now P0 is differ-
ent, in particular we have
e11X = e
11
X (∞) +
1
2
(
1
2 − e11X (∞)
)
(1− P 110 )1+τ
2− P 110
, (17)
eZ = eZ(∞) + 1
2
(
1
2 − eZ(∞)
)
(1− P0)1+τ
2− P0 , (18)
with P 110 = p(1)ηT the probability to store single-photon
states in one quantum memory.
We have thus derived all quantities present in the for-
mula of the secret key rate, and we can now evaluate and
characterize the protocol.
In Fig. 6 we show the comparison between MDI-QKD-
REPEATER-WCP and MDI-QKD-RELAY-WCP . As
we see quantum memories permit to increase significantly
the secret key rate or the distance where it is possible to
perform QKD.
As shown in Fig. 3, the minimally allowed coherence
time τMINWCP is larger then τ
MIN
SPS . The reason is that now
the produced state contains also a vacuum that reduces
the probability that a photon arrives to the quantum
memory. However, the difference is less than one order
of magnitude. Moreover, analogously to the case of SPS
the flat region(τ → ∞) of the secret key rate is reached
already with τ = 5τMINWCP .
In practical cases, only a finite number of different de-
coy states is used. In order to adapt our result to this
case it is enough to use the results of [13]. Moreover,
finite-size corrections are necessary for giving realistic es-
timates. This can be done by adopting the formalism
developed in [15–17]
7IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have explored the possibility to en-
able long distance QKD without entanglement sources.
We have shown that when quantum memories are used it
is possible to improve the distance where measurement-
device-independent quantum key distribution can be im-
plemented. Moreover, we have shown that the protocol
we consider in this paper is robust against common de-
vice imperfections such as detector efficiency, quantum
memory retrieval efficiency and finite decoherence time.
We believe that our result could be used as a first step in
the development of long-distance quantum key distribu-
tion. It requires weak coherent pulse sources, which are
already available commercially, and heralded quantum
memories which are under current development.
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APPENDIX
We prove eq. (14) when the Bell-state measurement
is done between two WCP states in the computational
basis. The proof for the case of the diagonal basis is
analogous.
We define
Gi1i2i3i4
(
ρ
(na)
A , ρ
(nb)
B
)
:= tr
(
Π
(1)
di1
Π
(0)
di2
Π
(1)
di3
Π
(0)
di4
E
(
ρ
(na)
A ⊗ ρ(nb)B
))
(19)
where E represents the action of the partial BSM and is
given by the following mapping (see Fig. 2)
bH → d3 + d4
2
, bV → d1 − d2
2
, (20)
aH → d1 + d2
2
, aV → d3 − d4
2
, (21)
where aH , aV are the modes of ρA and bH , bV are the
modes of ρB. The POVM elements of threshold detectors
are given by
Π(0) :=
∞∑
i=0
(1− ηD)i |i〉 〈i| ,Π(1) :=
∞∑
i=0
(1− (1− ηD)i) |i〉 〈i| .
(22)
The success probability of a BSM is given by
PBSM (na, nb) :=
1
4
∑
i1i2i3i4∈A
∑
φ∈B
Gi1i2i3i4
(
φ⊗na , φ⊗nb
)
, (23)
where A = {1234, 1243, 2134, 2143} is the set con-
taining the combinations of two-fold detection lead-
ing to a successful entanglement swapping and B =
{|HH〉 〈HH | , |V V 〉 〈V V |} is a set containing the quan-
tum states produced by the two sources of Alice and Bob
when they choose the computational basis. The set B
does not contain the cross-terms like σ := |HH〉 〈V V |
because Gi1i2i3i4 (σ
⊗na , σ⊗nb) = 0. Due to the symme-
tries of the map E we find that the function G is equal
for all combinations of indices in A and quantum states
in B, therefore
PBSM (na, nb) =
4 · 2
4
G1234
(
|HH〉 〈HH |⊗na , |HH〉 〈HH|⊗nb
)
. (24)
Using the fact that |HH〉 := a†Hb†H |0〉 and using the defi- nition of E it is straightforward, but lengthly, to calculate
8G and finally to find the result in eq. (14).
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